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To check the effects of  formal job training programs, it is useful to have  a 
benchmark-a  measure of  productivity changes that  would have  occurred 
without formal training. This study provides such a benchmark by  reporting 
changes in the productivity of workers who do not participate in formal train- 
ing  programs.  Those  workers  may  be  benefiting  from  informal  training: 
learning-by-doing  or learning by watching other people doing the same or sim- 
ilar tasks. 
Standard measures of the return to formal training may be overstating the 
true return in two ways.  First, if  formal training is a substitute for informal 
training, then the forgone benefits from informal training should be subtracted 
from the returns to formal training. Second, if informal training is bundled with 
formal training programs and if that informal training would have occurred in 
the absence of  formal training, then standard measures of  returns to formal 
training will again be overstated: The productivity gains from the bundled in- 
formal training should be  subtracted from the  estimated returns to formal 
training. 
The effects of  informal training on labor productivity may  be large. For 
instance, perhaps the best-documented finding in the industrial engineering 
literature is that production costs consistently decline by  10-30  percent every 
time cumulative output doubles.’ These declines are observed even when re- 
searchers correct for the effects of capital investments.* 
Andrew Weiss is professor of economics at Boston University. 
The author is grateful to Lisa Lynch for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper and 
for suggesting the term “informal training” to summarize learning on the job. Earlier versions of 
this paper were presented at NBEWCEP Conference on International Comparisons of Private Sec- 
tor Training, at the Centre for Economic Performance, London School of  Economics, December 
16, 1991, at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and at Dartmouth College. This paper 
benefited from substantial research help from Alexandra Lomakin. 
1. Perhaps the most forceful advocates of the experience curve effect have been members of the 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG). As early as 1973 the BCG maintained, “It [the experience curve] 
is so universal that its absence is almost a warning of mismanagement or misunderstanding [how- 
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The most  commonly  accepted  explanation  for  these  cost  reductions  is 
learning-by-doing. If  this explanation is correct, then biases in standard esti- 
mates of the return to formal training are likely to be large. In this paper we 
estimate the effects of  informal training on the productivity  of  a sample of 
newly hired production workers. We find that the effects are large during the 
workers’ first few months on the job but fall rapidly. There are no noticeable 
improvements in the productivity of workers with more than six months of job 
tenure. Thus for the workers in our sample, learning-by-doing does not cause 
the significant gains associated with cumulative output. 
Most previous estimates of the effects of learning-by-doing are derived ei- 
ther from aggregate data at the firm, or industry, level or from wage equations 
which implicitly assume that wages are proportional to productivity. That as- 
sumption is invalid if workers acquire firm-specific human capital. If workers 
have skills that are specific to a firm, equilibrium is generally characterized by 
wages that systematically deviate from the marginal product of  the worker: 
Experienced workers will be paid less than the full value of their output (they 
do not capture the entire return  to their firm-specific training), while newly 
hired workers could be paid more or less than the value of their output, de- 
pending on how the costs and benefits of firm-specific training are distributed. 
Similarly, even in the absence of firm-specific  training or human  capital, 
informational asymmetries may lead to wages that are not proportional to the 
marginal products of workers. Firms may commit to wages for experienced 
workers that are above the marginal products of those workers as a means of 
attracting workers who are unlikely either to quit or to be fired. These high 
wages would be financed by paying newly hired workers wages that are less 
than those warranted by their expected productivity. Steep wage-tenure profiles 
also  discourage  quits,  absenteeism,  or  shirking  by  those   worker^.^  Conse- 
quently there are serious difficulties with using wage changes as proxies for 
changes in labor productivity. 
ever] the basic mechanism that produces the experience curve effect is still to be adequately ex- 
plained” (quoted in Abernathy and Wayne  1974). Economists and managerial consultants have 
typically assumed that learning-by-doing generates the learning curve and have made recommen- 
dations both for corporate and national policy based on that assumption. See Arrow (1962) and 
Spence (1981) for particularly insightful treatments of  the implications of learning-by-doing for 
corporate strategy. 
2. Berndt (1991) has argued that most estimates of  learning effects are biased because they are 
also capturing scale effects. Studies that have attempted to measure scale effects separately from 
learning effects include Lieberman (1984) and Joskow and Rose (1985). 
3. In Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1982) firms pay the workers that they keep wages that exceed 
the value of their output and pay newly hired workers less than the value of their output. This wage 
schedule deters applications from workers who believe they will be unsuccessful (or who think 
they are likely to quit). Similarly, in Salop and Salop (1976) and Salop (1973, 1979) wages rise 
faster than productivity, either to attract workers with low quit propensities or to reduce the proba- 
bility of a given worker’s quitting. In all those models, experienced workers are paid more than 
the value of their marginal product. Greenwald (1986) presents a model in which firms pay their 
experienced workers less than the value of their output. In the Greenwald model, firms gain private 151  Productivity Changes without Formal Training 
We avoid those problems by using direct measures of physical output. How- 
ever, these direct measures have their own problems. First, we have data from 
only three factories; it is possible that the results are idiosyncratic to either the 
production technologies in those factories or to the specific workers studied. 
A related problem is that because the productivity  of individual workers was 
carefully monitored, there may have been strong peer-group pressure not to 
“break the rates,” i.e., not to produce at too fast a pace. If measuring output 
seriously depresses output growth, then using direct measures of output to esti- 
mate  the effects  of  learning-by-doing  on productivity  would  underestimate 
those effects for workers whose output is not directly measured. Peer pressure 
to work at less than one’s optimal pace is likely to have its greatest effects on 
the most able workers. Indeed, in Weiss (1992) we showed that productivity 
improvements are negatively correlated with initial productivity levels. This 
convergence to a standard pace could explain the lack of productivity improve- 
ments among the experienced workers in our sample. Although peer pressure 
to meet a standard is not a special characteristic of the establishments in our 
study, it is a common  feature of labor relations in firms, and thus  is likely 
to affect the relationship between experience and labor productivity  in many 
different settings. 
5.1  Evidence from Production Workers 
This study shall use data from groups of workers hired at three facilities of 
a large telecommunications  manufacturer.  The telecommunications  industry 
had exceptionally rapid rates of growth in both total factor productivity and in 
labor productivity during the years we studied: Value added per worker grew 
80.6 percent between  1977 and  1982, and value added per hour grew 84.2 
percent. In the manufacturing sector as a whole, those growth rates were 63 
percent and 66.7 percent, respectively. If the growth in labor productivity  is 
due to learning-by-doing by production workers, we would expect to find that 
experience strongly affects labor productivity for the workers in our sample. 
The workers are grouped in the following way: workers hired at plant A in 
1977, workers hired at plant A in 1979, workers hired at plant B, and workers 
hired at plant C. Plant A assembled components, plant B assembled small final 
products, and plant C assembled large computers. These data were first ana- 
lyzed in  1980, in an effort to improve the hiring criteria of the firm.  (At the 
time the only objective criterion for hiring workers was scores on a simple 
information about their employees, generating a “winner’s curse” situation which deters other 
firms from bidding for those workers. Consequently, all firms can underpay their experienced 
workers. Firms offer inexperienced workers wages that exceed their expected productivities, by 
an amount sufficient to offset (in expected present value) the future profits the firms will get be- 
cause of  the private information they will acquire about those workers. 152  Andrew Weiss 
Table 5.1  Characteristics of the Sample 
Characteristic 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation 
Mean age (years)  25.00  1.3 
Fraction male  0.43 
Fraction married  0.44 
Fraction employed at application  0.5 1 
Median pay increase (Yo)  103 
Mean education (years)  12.10  1.2 
~~  ~ 
Note: Sample consists of usable output data for approximately 2,000 workers, the exact number 
depends on the independent vanable being considered. 
dexterity test.)4  The data were originally collected to help administer the wage 
incentive plan. Relevant characteristics of the sample are presented in table 5.1. 
These data have several significant virtues. We have direct measures of the 
output of  those semiskilled production workers in the sample who were as- 
signed to “bench’ as opposed to assembly line jobs. Consequently the workers 
in our subsample had considerable control over the pace at which they worked. 
These workers were paid piece rate until they had worked for a calendar month 
in which their output was 82.5 percent of  the expected output for an experi- 
enced worker on that job. At that point the worker was assigned to a pay group 
and paid according to the output of her group. The average pay group had 125 
members, so that once a worker joined a pay group her performance had only 
a very small effect on her output. Almost all the workers were in pay groups 
by their third or fourth month on the job. The lack of direct financial incentives 
for these workers is typical of U.S. production workers. It is unusual for U.S. 
workers to receive individual incentive pay or to have their pay directly linked 
to their output. 
These workers were atypical in that their output was carefully monitored: 
the output of  each worker in a pay group has an effect, albeit small, on the 
pay of every worker in that group. Because of the direct connection between 
performance and pay, great care was taken to determine the expected level of 
output for an experienced worker on each job. These standards are set by the 
industrial engineering staff at each location. Engineers from the firm’s head- 
quarters review the standards. The typical revision of  a job standard involves a 
correction of less than 2.5 percent. Standards that workers perceive as unusu- 
ally demanding can be appealed through a union grievance procedure. More 
attention is paid to achieving uniformity of rates within a plant than uniformity 
4. In plants A and B, a two-part dexterity test was administered. The first part was a pins test in 
which applicants were asked to insert small pins into sleeves. Their score was the number of pins 
they were able to insert during a three-minute period. The second part of  the test measured how 
many  screws an  applicant was able to fully insert into threaded sleeves during a three-minute 
period. In plant C, only the screws test was administered. 153  Productivity Changes without Formal Training 
across plants. It is difficult for workers or officials of the union local to com- 
pare rates for jobs that are 1,000 miles apart. It is easier to see that the person 
sitting next to you is working at a significantly slower pace. Thus there is more 
pressure by  workers on  the industrial engineers to achieve rate uniformity 
within  a plant than  across plants. Second, the differences among jobs are 
greater across plants than within plants. These differences increase the relative 
difficulty of achieving uniformity of rates across plants. 
For workers assigned to a new job, the expected output for each worker is 
adjusted according to the “learning curve” associated with that job. Industrial 
engineers estimate the job-specific learning curve by determining the propor- 
tion of the expected output of an experienced worker they expect a newly hired 
worker to produce when first assigned to the job. The median expected learn- 
ing times for jobs at plants A, B, and C in this study were 12,7, and 15 weeks, 
respectively. Within the entire subsample the expected learning time ranged 
from 1 to 36 weeks. 
5.2  Effects of Learning-by-Doing 
The data in table 5.2 describe median changes in  the physical output of 
individual workers. (Note, we are not reporting the change in median produc- 
tivity. Those data are reported in table 5.4, below.) Thus the data in table 5.2 
remove most of the effects of changes in labor-force composition on changes 
in average productivity. Sample selection bias remains only if employment or 
hiring decisions are correlated with future changes in productivity. Further- 
more, that correlation must not be a general feature of  labor markets. One 
source of  sample selection bias that is likely to have remained in the data is 
differential quit rates. Quit rates are likely to be higher among workers who 
anticipate having the most difficulty meeting performance standards. These 
will tend to be workers whose initial productivity was low and who anticipate 
relatively small increases in their future productivity. In general, the high quit 
rates of workers who anticipate not achieving sufficient growth in productivity 
to meet the standards will lead to overestimates of the effects of experience on 
productivity. These effects could be offset, or even reversed, if  the workers 
whose initial performance was high had lower rates of growth of output. In- 
Table 5.2  Median Percentage Change in Productivity 







10.8  18.5  45.2  35.4 
2.0  2.0  13.0  8.3 
0.8  0.8  6.4  3.2 
0.4  0.4  3.0  1.9 
0.0  0.4  1 .o  0.3 
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deed, we find that relationship in our data (see Weiss 1992), thus the direction 
of the bias from the correlation between  quit rates and expected growth  in 
productivity is unclear.s 
Plant A had data on the monthly output during the first six months of em- 
ployment both for workers hired in  1977 and for workers hired in  1979. For 
workers who were hired in  1977 at plant A and who remained with the firm 
for six months, the median change in their output between their fifth and sixth 
months on the job was precisely zero. The median change in output from their 
sixth month on the job to the last period for which we had records was  -1 
percent. (This last period varied across workers, depending on when in 1977 
they were hired.) 
For workers hired in plant A in  1979, the median change in productivity 
between the fifth and sixth months was 0.4 percent. This contrasts with a me- 
dian increase in productivity  of  18 percent from the first to second months of 
employment. Because of an unanticipated fall in product demand, few of those 
workers stayed with the firm beyond six months. But extrapolating from trend, 
we would expect trivial increases in output past the sixth month on the job. 
The sample sizes for these cohorts varied somewhat during the sample period 
due to quits or to workers being reassigned to assembly-line jobs or to jobs at 
which individual output could not be directly measured. To give some idea of 
the sample sizes: in the 1977 sample we had usable output data for 585 workers 
during their sixth month on the job. For the 1979 sample we had usable output 
data for 308 workers during their sixth month on the job. (Those workers were 
on bench jobs, so their output could be measured, and were on the same job 
for the entire month.) 
Workers  at plant B had  much  more rapid increases in their productivity. 
The management at this plant had a reputation for pressing workers to work 
exceptionally fast. From the first to the second month of employment the me- 
dian change in output was 45 percent. This relatively high increase in output 
occurred despite this plant’s having the simplest jobs of any in our sample. If 
we had used only the learning curves to predict changes in productivity, we 
would have expected growth rates in output to be the lowest at plant B. Instead 
they were the highest. However, by the sixth month, productivity  growth had 
fallen  to  1 percent.  Extrapolating  from trend  we  would  expect  almost  no 
growth in productivity after the sixth month on the job. Unfortunately we did 
not have data on individual output after the sixth month for workers  in this 
5.  This observed relationship could exist because the effect of expected productivity gains on 
quit behavior is greater for workers with initially low levels of performance. In the extreme case, 
the quit propensities of workers whose productivities were well above the standard would not be 
affected by differences in anticipated increases in productivity, while among workers whose initial 
performance was  low,  only those who anticipated large gains in their productivity would  stay. 
These differences in quit propensity could explain why productivity growth is negatively corre- 
lated with initial productivity. 155  Productivity Changes without Formal Training 
plant. As in plant A, the sample size varied with tenure at the plant. For in- 
stance, we had usable output data for 182 workers during their fourth month 
on the job. 
The demands on the workers in plant B were also reflected in a relatively 
high quit rate. The quit rate at this plant was 22 percent during a worker’s first 
six months of employment. At plants A and C the quit rates were 9 and  12 
percent,  respectively. The high quit rate at plant B might give rise to large 
overestimates of the effect of experience on labor productivity for a randomly 
selected worker. Because of the difficult standards at plant B, an exceptionally 
large proportion of the workers at that plant may be quitting because they do 
not expect to achieve sufficient productivity gains to meet the plant’s standards. 
Workers in plant C had the most sophisticated jobs of any workers in our 
sample. In  that plant the median increase in output was 35 percent from a 
worker’s  first to second month on the job. By the sixth month, productivity 
changes had effectively ceased. At this plant we had usable output data for 178 
workers during their sixth month on the job. 
5.3  Changes in Work-Force Composition 
In the previous section we restricted our attention to changes in the produc- 
tivity  of  workers.  However, cumulative  output  may  provide information to 
workers and firms which enables them to better sort themselves. One of the 
benefits of production is that it can improve the match between workers and 
jobs. The least productive workers may be pressed to work at a pace that they 
find so difficult to maintain that they are induced to quit. 
In table 5.3 we computed probit estimates of the probability of a worker’s 
quitting within her first six months on the job.6 The quit function with respect 
to first-month output has an interior minimum. While the best and the worst 
workers are most likely to quit, the workers who are least likely to quit are 
more productive than the average workers. The workers with the lowest ex- 
pected quit probabilities  had productivity levels, during their first month of 
employment, that were roughly one standard deviation above the mean produc- 
tivity for the entire sample. Most quits are among workers with relatively low 
initial rates of output. Thus, for the firm we studied, quits by production work- 
ers appear to improve the quality of its work force. 
The correlation between quit probabilities and some of the other indepen- 
dent variables is of independent interest. The strongest finding is that workers 
who quit a job in order to take this job are less likely to quit than are workers 
who were unemployed at the time they applied for this job. The obvious expla- 
6. In estimating the quit equations, we excluded from the sample any workers laid off before 
they completed six months of employment with the firm. We  also excluded workers that would 
have been laid off before completing six months of employment with the firm, had they not quit 
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Table 5.3  Probit Estimates for Quits within First Six Months on the Job 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent Variable  Estimate 
First-month output. 
(First-month output)2 
Total years of schooling 
Postsecondary education 
Employed at applicationb 
Male 
Married 
Score on dexterity test 
Job complexity‘ 
Plant A dummy variable 
Plant B dummy variable 
Total years of schooling interacted with job complexityd 
Age 
-0.335  (0.164) 
0.123 (0.075) 
-0.022  (0.017) 
0.001 (0.004) 
-0.079  (0.029) 
0.034 (0.032) 
-0.028  (0.028) 





-0.001  (0.002) 
“A  measure of the worker’s output during her first month of employment, adjusted by the industrial 
engineers for the difficulty of learning the job. 
bA dummy variable taking the value  1 if the worker was employed at the time she applied for 
the job. 
‘The logarithm of the number of weeks the industrial engineering staff estimates that it takes to be 
fully trained on the worker’s job. 
dDifference between the worker’s schooling and mean schooling X difference between the com- 
plexity of the job and mean job complexity. 
nation for this result is that the worker-job match for workers who were em- 
ployed when they applied for these jobs is likely to be better than for workers 
who were unemployed. Employed workers only quit their jobs if  the antici- 
pated increase in utility outweighed their costs of  changing jobs, thus those 
workers are likely to have  superior job matches and lower costs of  quitting. 
For determining quits in our sample, the matching effect appears to outweigh 
differences in the costs of changing jobs. We also find that men are more likely 
to quit than are women; this difference in quit propensities may be due either 
to better alternative opportunities for men or to the discomfort felt by men in 
working in a predominantly female work force: While the new hires were 44 
percent male, the existing labor force was less than 20 percent male. Finally, 
job complexity does not seem to reduce quits, nor does matching the better- 
educated workers to the more complex jobs appear to have a significant effect 
on quits. 
5.4  Combined Sorting and Learning Effects 
Table 5.4 describes the differences in the output of  various tenure groups. 
No attempt is made to correct for changes in labor-force composition: The 157  Productivity Changes without Formal Training 
data illustrate the combined sorting and learning effects of experience on labor 
productivity. For instance, we can see that the expected output of a randomly 
selected worker with three months of tenure at this establishment is 11.7 per- 
cent higher than that of a randomly selected worker with two months of tenure. 
Workers with six months of tenure are, on average, 1.7 percent more produc- 
tive than workers with only five months of tenure. Workers with more than six 
months of  experience are not  any more  productive than  workers with  six 
months of  experience. Note that when we are comparing groups of  workers 
with different amounts of tenure, the composition of the group has in general 
changed over time. Some of the workers quit or were laid off during the first 
six months they were employed. Those workers will be included in the compu- 
tation of  median and mean productivities for the months before they quit or 
were laid off but not for the month they were laid off (or for any later month). 
Consequently, the data in table 5.4 include the effects both of changes in the 
composition of the work force and of changes in the performance of individual 
workers. (The data in table 5.4 describe changes in the means and medians 
rather than the median of the changes as in table 5.2.) 
During their first month of employment, almost all the workers spent some 
of their time watching other workers. Therefore, measuring the changes in out- 
put from month one to month two for many of the workers involves a compari- 
son of  their output during their first one or two weeks on the job with their 
output during their next four weeks on the job. Since we do not know how 
much time workers spent watching other workers doing their jobs, versus do- 
ing the job themselves, it is difficult to precisely measure the effect of experi- 
ence on the change in output. For the workers in our sample, this problem is 
unlikely to be of great importance after their first month on the job. 
Table 5.4  Changes in Productivity with Tenure Combined Sorting and 
Learning Effects 
Period over Which  Change in Median  Change in Mean 
Change is Measured  Hourly Output (%)  Hourly Output (%) 
Month 1 to 2' 
Month 2 to 3 
Month 3 to 4 
Month 4 to 5 
Month 5 to 6 
Month 6 to 18 (plant A) 
Month 6 to 7 (plant C) 
Month 7 to 8 (plant C) 
Month 5 to 6 (plant A; workers in lowest 
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While the expected productivity  of a labor force with two months of job 
experience is 44 percent greater than that of a labor force with one month of 
experience,  these productivity improvements decline rapidly as we compare 
more experienced cohorts. Among workers who have been employed for at 
least six months, we do not see any further increases in productivity. 
As discussed above, we are measuring the combined effect both of changes 
in the performance of individual workers and of changes in the composition of 
the work force. Because the least able workers are most likely to quit, these 
data are likely to give an upwardly biased estimate of the effect of learning- 
by-doing on productivity during a worker’s first six months of employment. In 
other words, even if none of the workers increased individual productivity in 
any period, we would find increases in productivity in each period, because the 
least able workers were more likely to quit in each period. 
It  is relatively  easy  to  compare  the  data  in  table  5.4  with  data  from 
experience-curve studies which also do not adjust for differences in quit pro- 
pensities among more and less able workers. The data in table 5.4 suggest that 
neither favorable selection nor learning-by-doing  of  production  workers can 
explain the experience curve. In the data we analyzed, there was no evidence 
of a correlation between the cumulative output of the product associated with 
a worker’s job and labor productivity on that job. There is, however, one group 
whose measured productivity shows significant growth even after five months 
on the job. These are workers whose initial productivity placed them in the 
lowest quartile (adjusting for the difficulty of learning their job). The output 
of those workers increases by 5 percent from their fifth to sixth month on the 
job. For data on low-productivity workers, we only included workers in plant 
A. In plant B the productivity of the bottom quartile was so low that workers 
who were still with the firm at the end of six months would have to have been 
increasing their output significantly to avoid pressure to quit. For plant C the 
small size of the sample and the long average learning curves precluded doing 
any meaningful analysis of  the performance of workers with low initial pro- 
ductivity. Because those workers are likely to be ones for whom the learning 
curve was underestimated, in plant C this measurement error could also distort 
the change in output measures from their fifth to sixth month of employment. 
Only plant C had jobs for which the expected learning period exceeded  six 
months. 
5.5  Concluding Remarks 
The main conclusions we would draw from this study are that rapid produc- 
tivity growth occurs during the first month that production  workers are em- 
ployed,  even  without  formal job training  programs.  However,  productivity 
growth falls rapidly and effectively stops by the sixth month on the job. The 
fall may be due to peer pressure not to “break the rates.” 159  Productivity Changes without Formal Training 
The data we have presented  also cast some light on the extent to which 
aggregate  productivity  growth  is due to  learning-by-doing.  It  appears  that 
learning-by-doing by production workers has only a small effect on productiv- 
ity growth. Despite the very rapid rates of productivity growth in the industry 
we studied, there was almost no net change in the output of workers after they 
gained four to six months of experience on their jobs. If the widely observed 
correlation between cumulative output and labor productivity is due to factors 
other than learning-by-doing, then policies designed to increase market share 
(either at the firm  or national level) as a means of reducing future costs may 
be misguided. Policies that directly address factors, such as cumulative engi- 
neering inputs, that are causing the correlation between cumulative output and 
labor productivity are likely to be more effective. 
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